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The contribution of jurisdiction as a technique of  
demand side regulation in claims for the recovery of cultural objects 
 
Lorna E Gillies 
 
This article considers the role of jurisdiction in supporting private claims for the cross-border 
recovery of cultural objects from an EU Member State. In particular, this article considers a 
new, “sui generis”1 special jurisdiction rule in Article 7(4) of Regulation EU 1215/2012, the 
Brussels I Recast Regulation. Article 7(4), inter alia, enables “(A) person domiciled in a Member 
State to be sued in the courts of another Member State […] as regards a civil claim for the 
recovery, based on ownership, of a cultural object as defined in point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 
[EU 93/7] initiated by the person claiming the right to recover such an object, in the courts for 
the place where the cultural object is situated at the time when the court is seised.” This 
special jurisdiction rule is a welcome development towards facilitating the return of a cultural 
object from the place where it is seized (for example where there is market demand or when 
the object is in transit), to a party asserting ownership. In practice the utility of this special 
jurisdiction rule will depend upon its scope and interpretation by the Court of Justice together 
with its ability to offer a “counterbalance”2 to Article 4 and the other special grounds of 
jurisdiction in the Brussels I Recast Regulation. This paper concludes that the special 
jurisdiction rule is a key step towards an EU-led “transnational policy of protection of cultural 
property,”3 which may require further approximation of EU private international law in the 
future. 
Keywords: Brussels I Recast, cultural object, jurisdiction, recovery, ownership, enforcement, 
demand side regulation 
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Villata (eds), Recasting Brussels I: proceedings of the conference held at the University of Milan on November 25 
- 26, 2011 (CEDAM, Padua, 2012), 107. Word modified for syntax. 
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A. Introduction 
1. The nature of the problem 
“It is demand that controls the market, and to address the illicit trade [in cultural objects], 
demand side control is required.”4 
Cultural objects5 are representations of the identity and heritage of cultures, individuals, 
groups and societies. Cultural objects take numerous forms, from tangible artefacts such as 
tangible movable and immovable property to intangible music, song, film and dance.6 For 
many centuries, cultural objects - classified7  for the focus8  of this article as movable, 
“tangible artifacts of cultural significance”9 - have been acquired by private parties and sold 
legitimately in the market. However, there continues to be instances where such objects are 
“threaten[ed] [by] war, illicit trafficking,10 social and economic upheaval, unregulated 
excavation and neglect.”11 Such activities often result in the objects being physically 
transferred to jurisdictions where market demand for such objects is high or where the 
objects are moved between jurisdictions for the purposes of transferring title or raising 
                                                          
4 C Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage (Routledge, Abingdon, 2010) 156. Words 
in square brackets added. 
5 As Ulph affirms, “(A) simple, universally agreed, definition of what objects can be described as cultural 
objects does not exist. Domestic law varies, reflecting national cultural priorities,” ; J Ulph and I Smith, The 
Illicit Trade in Art and Antiquities, International Recovery and Criminal and Civil Liability (Hart: Oxford, 2012), 
40; J Nafziger, “Introduction,” in J. Nafziger (ed) Cultural Heritage Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012) xiii. 
6 J Nafziger, ibid, xiii. 
7 As Prott and O’Keefe confirm, “(T)he process of classification [of property] is designed to make it intellectually 
easier to assess the interests involved and the appropriate response”; L V Prott and P J O’Keefe “Cultural 
Heritage” in J Nafziger (ed) Cultural Heritage Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012) 9. Words added for syntax). 
The term ‘cultural object’ is used in this article to reflect the choice of this term in Regulation EU 1215/2012. 
8 E M Cottrell, “Keeping the Barbarians Outside the Gate: Toward a Comprehensive International Agreement 
Protecting Cultural Property,” (2009) 9 Chicago Journal of International Law 627, 633. 
9 Nafziger, supra n 5; J Blake, “On Defining Cultural Heritage,” (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 61 and reproduced in Nafziger (ed), ibid, 24 referring to “material culture.” 
10 European Commission, “Proposal For a Directive of The European Parliament and of The Council on The 
Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed From The Territory of a Member State (Recast),” 2013/0162 
(COD) 30/05/13, 3 and European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document Summary of the Impact 
Assessment, Accompanying The Document, Proposal For A Directive Of The European Parliament and of The 
Council on The Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed From The Territory of a Member State 
(Recast),”  SWD (2013) 188 final, both 30/05/13.  
11 Forrest, supra n 4, 137-138; T Aldercreutz, “Publication Review International Law and the Protection of 
Cultural Heritage” (2011) 18 International Journal of Cultural Property, 397, 400. 
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security. The legal nature of a cultural object crosses the boundary between public-private12 
ownership when ownership is acquired by a third party, through commercial means such as 
a sale or by auction. Whilst states often attribute special status to a cultural object, it is a 
complex mix of public and private law which seeks to coordinate and regulate the acquisition, 
protection, preservation, transfer of ownership and recovery of such objects between 
jurisdictions. Over the last six decades, four UNESCO Conventions, one UNIDROIT Convention, 
one EU Regulation and two EU Directives have introduced particular public law measures with 
the objective of providing what Chong has previously articulated as a “transnational policy of 
protection of cultural property.”13 Each instrument seeks to protect cultural objects in specific 
contexts. Whilst two of the five UNESCO Conventions enable Contracting States to seek the 
return14 of cultural objects removed from a jurisdiction, only the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects15  (where enacted 16)  allows a private, civil 
claim for the recovery of a cultural object which has been wrongfully removed. 
  
                                                          
12 On the contribution of the “public-private divide” in determining questions on cultural property, see B 
Kuzmarov,”The Coherence of the Concept of Cultural Property: A Critical Examination,” (2013) 20 International 
Journal of Cultural Property 233, 236, and M A Vargas,” Pondering Dysfunctions in Heritage Protection: lessons 
from the theft of the Codex Calixtinus,” (2014) 21 International Journal of Cultural Property, 1, 2. 
13 Chong, supra n 3, 106. 
14 The words “rectification”, “return” and “recovery” are used relative to the primary source. 
15 “UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects,” available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/1995culturalproperty/1995culturalproperty-acts-e.pdf  
(accessed 15 April 2013) hereafter “1995 Convention.” 
16 The EU Member States that have acceded to and implemented the 1995 Convention are Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden ; ibid. 
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2. What are we dealing with? The meaning and commodification of a ‘cultural object’ 
For the purposes of this article, a cultural object is classified17 as a movable, “tangible artefact 
[…] of cultural significance.”18 The scope of this definition includes Article 1(1) of “Council 
Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of 
a Member State.”19 The definition in Article 1(1) EU 93/7, whilst “narrow in scope,”20 has been 
an important step in “coordinating”21 private claims for the recovery of cultural objects 
situated in an EU Member State. According to Article 1(1), the Directive applies to cultural 
objects in three respects. The first aspect is that the cultural object is “among[st] the ‘national 
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value’ under national legislation or 
administrative procedures [within Article 36 TFEU].” The second aspect is that the cultural 
object falls within one of the categories in the Annex to the Directive or is an “integral part of 
public collections listed in the inventories of museums [or] ecclesiastical institutions.”22 The 
third aspect is that the cultural object was classified as such either “before or after its unlawful 
removal from the territory of a Member State.”  
 
Directive 93/7/EEC applies to situations where a cultural object has been “unlawfully 
removed [… or] not returned after a period of lawful temporary removal […].”23 For example, 
a tangible cultural object may be illegally excavated, exported, stolen from or not returned to 
                                                          
17 See supra n 7.  
18 Nafziger, supra n 5, xiii ; J Blake, supra n 9. 
19 Council Directive 93/7/EEC on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a 
Member State 1993 OJ L74 (hereafter Directive 93/7/EEC). 
20 Ulph, supra n 5, 184. 
21 Nafziger, supra n 5, xxii; “Directive 2014/60/EU on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the 
territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No.1024/2012 (Recast),” Recitals 5 and 6. This 
Directive will replace Directive 93/7/EEC with effect from 19 December 2015; OJ L159/1, 28/05/14. 
22 Article 1(1), Directive 93/7/EEC. 
23 Article 1(2), Directive 93/7/EEC.  
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Country A (the supply State). It may then be transferred to Country B (a demand or transit 
state) for the purposes of acquiring good title under the law of Country B. It may then be sold 
to an innocent third purchaser in Country B or Country C (another demand state). The 
‘market’ for cultural objects is increasingly international with buyers and sellers situated in 
different jurisdictions. In 2011, Nafziger estimated that the value of stolen (illicit) cultural 
objects was “as high as $4 billion annually.”24 There is also a corresponding concern with the 
“commoditization”25 of licit objects in response to market demand. Recent examples which 
necessitate the cross-border interest in and sustained commercial demand for tangible, 
cultural objects26 include the authorisation by a French court for the sale of seventy Hopi 
sacred objects – with a combined estimated value of US$1 million27 - and the removal of 
graffiti art from a building in London, England to Florida, United States, its sale in Florida and 
subsequent return for auction in London.28  
 
In fostering an established “legal order”29 for the protection of cultural objects, the 
coordination of rules to facilitate civil claims for the return of a cultural object wrongfully 
removed from a Member State should operate in tandem with both established international 
                                                          
24 Nafziger (ed), supra n 5, xvi. 
25 L V Prott and P J O’Keefe, supra n 7, 7 ; Ulph and Smith, supra n 5, 4. 
26 The highest contemporary art sale (US$495m) took place in New York: BBC News, “Christie’s Auction Sale 
“highest in auction history,”” (BBC News, 16 May 2013) at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-
22552373> accessed 16 May 2013.  
27 BBC News, “Paris Judge Allows Auction of Arizona Masks,” (BBC News, 12 April 2012) at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22120133> accessed 12 April 2013. Had these sacred objects been 
the property of a French museum, they would have been provided with the level of protection afforded to State-
owned objects; Prott and O’Keefe, supra n 7, 11. 
28 BBC News, “Taken Banksy is Withdrawn from sale,” (BBC News, 24 February 2013) at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-21562042> accessed 24 February 2013 and subsequently 
BBC News, “Banksy”s Slave Labour Mural Auctioned in London,” (BBC News, 2 June 2013) at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-22749345> accessed 2 June 2013. 
29 F Francioni, “Plurality and Interaction of Legal Orders in the Enforcement of Cultural Heritage Law,” in F 
Francioni and J Gordley (eds), Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law, (Oxford: University Press, 2013), 
9-10. 
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conventions and alternative means of redress. Whilst attractive, alternative means of redress 
through mediation and arbitration still predominantly remain developing mechanisms for 
securing the recovery of cultural objects. This article therefore focusses on the continued 
contribution of private international law, specifically the role of jurisdiction,30 in supporting a 
civil claim by a party for the recovery of a tangible, movable cultural object that has been 
removed by theft or illegal export to an EU Member State. This article focusses on the new, 
special jurisdiction rule in Regulation EU 1215/2012 (the Brussels I Recast Regulation) for 
private claims by a party asserting ownership for the recovery of a cultural object. This special 
jurisdiction rule is a welcome development towards facilitating the return of a cultural object 
to a party asserting ownership. However, in practice the utility of this special jurisdiction rule 
will depend upon its scope and interpretation by the Court of Justice and its ability to offer a 
“counterbalance”31 to Article 4 and the other special grounds of jurisdiction in the Brussels I 
Recast Regulation. This paper examines the special jurisdiction rule as a step towards an EU 
“transnational policy of protection of cultural property,”32 and will consider whether in the 
longer term further approximation of EU private international laws for the coordination of 
civil claims concerned with cultural objects may be necessary to ensure protection and return. 
 
3. Changing legal responses to recovery of cultural objects via private claims 
For over two centuries, international law has provided that States have a general “duty”33 to 
“explicitly designate … protection”34 for cultural objects, including negotiating for their 
                                                          
30 On choice of law issues see, for example, P. Youngblood Reyhan, “A Chaotic Pallate: Conflict of Laws in 
Litigation between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art,” in J Nafziger (ed), Cultural 
Heritage Law (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012), 617. 
31 B Hess, in F Pocar, I Viarengo and F C Villata (eds), supra n 2, 107. Word modified for syntax. 
32 Chong, supra n 13, 106. 
33J Fawcett and JM Carruthers, Cheshire, North and Fawcett’s Private International Law (Oxford University Press, 
14th edn, 2008), 1223. 
34 Cheshire and North, ibid. 
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restitution, preservation and regulation.35  Such duty reflects the “principle of respect”36 for 
cultural objects as objects of national identity37 on the one hand and as objects of 
international cultural heritage38 on the other. For almost the last four decades, the emphasis 
and contribution39  of public international law has been on the “restitution of cultural objects 
to their country of origin.”40  
The legal response to securing the recovery of cultural objects continues to be 
influenced41 by the debates between post-cultural internationalism42  and cultural 
nationalism.43 The former is concerned with the necessity for wider protection of cultural 
heritage for the whole of humanity whilst the latter has focussed on respecting the rights of 
the state as owner of the object. The EU has sought to contribute to this debate by protecting 
the cultural nationalism of the EU Member States.  It seeks to achieve this through the 
“mutual recognition of Member States’ laws”44 and the “moral and material”45 return of a 
cultural object to the original owner (whether a State, indigenous group,46 private47 or natural 
                                                          
35A F Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural Objects (Cambridge; University Press, 
2006), 202, 204. 
36 F Francioni, “The human dimension of international cultural heritage law: an introduction,” (2011) European 
Journal of International Law 9. 
37 Vrdoljak, supra n 35, 205. 
38 Forrest, supra n 4, 145; Vrdoljak, supra n 35, 204. 
39J M Carruthers, The Transfer of Property in the Conflict of Laws, (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 132-133, 137, 143. 
40 Vrdoljak, supra n 35, 206. 
41 F Francioni and J Gordley (eds), Enforcing International Cultural Heritage Law, (Oxford: University Press, 
2013). 
42 Vrdoljak, supra n 35, 210; L V Prott, “The International Movement of Cultural Objects,” (2005) International  
Journal of Cultural Property 225, 228-231. 
43 J H Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,” (1986) 80 American Journal of International 
Law 831. 
44 Directive EU 2014/60, Recital 6, supra n 21. 
45 Vrdoljak, supra n 35, 299. On the utility of ADR methods see M Cornu and M A Renold, “New Developments 
In The Restitution of Cultural Property: Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution,” (2010) International Journal 
of Cultural Property 1, 7; cf where the authors observe that agreements between Italy and several US museums 
for the loan and restitution of cultural objects “quite surprisingly … contained no choice of law clause,” 19. Words 
removed for syntax. 
46 Vrdoljak, ibid. 
47 The Draft Common Frame of Reference proposes, as a minimum harmonisation rule, that ownership of a 
cultural object requires “continuous possession” for a period of either thirty years (with good faith) or fifty 
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person,48 or museum). Such an approach may go some way to “reconstitut[ing] individual and 
group identities.”49  
The increased commercial value or demand for cultural objects has prompted a 
change in normative legal and procedural responses.50 As stated earlier, only the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention enabled a private claim for the recovery of a cultural object. This 
Convention provides a minimum level of substantive and procedural “uniform rules”51 to 
facilitate claims by private individuals for the restitution of stolen cultural objects (Chapter II) 
or the return of illegally exported cultural objects (Chapter III),52 contrary to a Contracting 
State’s export laws. The 1995 Convention contains a variety of minimum substantive and 
procedural rules. For example, in cases of theft Article 3(3) provides a general limitation 
period of fifty years, reduced to three years if the claimant was aware of the location of the 
object and the party in possession of it. Article 3(4) provides that if the cultural object is “an 
integral part of an identified monument or archaeological site, or [part of] a public collection” 
the general limitation period does not apply unless the claimant knew the location of the 
cultural object and the party in possession of it has been identified. Articles 4 and 6 both 
provide that the possessor of a cultural object is entitled to “fair and reasonable 
                                                          
years (both of which are less than the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, considered below); C. Von Bar, E. Clive and 
H. Schulte-Nolke, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR), (Outline Edition, Sellier, European Law Publishers, 2009) at VIII-4:102. 
48 Government of Iran v Barakat Ltd [2007] ECWA Civ 1374. 
49 T. O’Donnell, “The restitution of Holocaust looted art and transitional justice: the perfect storm or the raft of 
the Medusa?” (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 49, 49. Words modified for syntax. 
50 Cornu and Renold, supra n 45, 7 ; contrast the function of “ethical rules and codes of honor” in M Frigo, “Ethical 
Rules and Codes of Honour Related To Museum Activities: A Complementary Support To The Private 
International Law Approach Concerning The Circulation of Cultural Property,” (2009) International Journal of 
Cultural Property 49. 
51 Forrest, supra n 4, 197. 
52 At present, thirty three Contracting States have acceded to this Convention; “Status of the UNIDRIOT 
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects”: <http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-
95.pdf> available at <http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/cultural-property/1995-convention> accessed 15 
April 2013. In the last decade, this figure represents a three-fold increase; see Carruthers, supra n 39, 134. 
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compensation” where that party exercised due diligence and was not aware that the object 
had been either stolen or illegally exported. The Contracting State in which the claim is 
brought must be satisfied that the foreign law breached is an export law, not a tax, revenue 
or penal law. Article 8 provides that a claim for return may be brought where the cultural 
object is located. However, this has been subject to Contracting States’ existing jurisdiction 
rules. Furthermore, by enabling provisional or protective measures to be initiated in the 
courts for the place where the object is found, Article 8(3) of the 1995 Convention provides 
an analogous provision to Article 35 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation.  
There are three broad techniques for the private “regulation and control”53 of tangible 
cultural objects.  The first technique is through transferring title via the substantive law. As 
with other forms of tangible, movable property, national substantive laws require parties to 
establish provenance and exercise due diligence when acquiring or transferring title of such 
property by sale or auction. The “appropriate transfer, and safe return [of] cultural material”54 
is generally subject to the law of the place where the property is situated (lex situs).55 The 
second technique through the application of export laws. States may apply export conditions, 
restrictions or prohibitions56 as export (supply),57 import (demand) or intermediate/transit58 
states. The third technique is provided by private international law. In particular, determining 
when it is appropriate to permit a private party to assert jurisdiction in civil proceedings for 
recovery of a cultural object. As Forrest explains  
                                                          
53 Nafziger (ed), supra n 5, xv. 
54 Nafziger, supra n 5, xvi. 
55 Youngblood Reyhan, in Nafziger, supra n 30, 622 ; Nafziger, at xvi. Word in brackets modified for syntax. 
56 2013/0162 (COD), 30/05/13, supra n 10, 2 and 3. 
57 Forrest, supra n 4, 157-160, where the author considers the “retentionist” approach via export regulations. 
58 The term “transit State” is used by Prott in the context of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention; L V Prott, 
Commentary on the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 1995, (Institute of 
Art and Law, Leicester, 1997) 16, and by Forrest, supra n 4, 138. 
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“… the problem [to be] addressed is the movement of cultural heritage from one entity 
to another where the entity has lost possession of the cultural heritage […] This 
necessarily raises not only complex notions of cultural identity, but also legal issues of 
ownership, possession and control.”59  
 
Assuming “autonomy”60 of legal ownership of the object persists in the country of origin 
(Country A), the subsequent loss of the right61 to possess the object and the acquisition of res 
extra commercium62 status through theft or illegal export to another jurisdiction (Country B 
or C in the above example) provides an opportunity to review the role of private international 
law in “demand side regulation and restraint.”63 In 2011, the European Commission launched 
a consultation for the revision of Directive EU 93/7 on the “Return of Cultural Objects 
Unlawfully Removed from EU Member Countries.” However, this Directive only equips 
Member States with the ability to bring patrimonial claims for the return of cultural objects 
classified as national treasures in accordance with Article 1(1) of the Directive. As far as 
private parties are concerned, further approximation of Member States’ private international 
laws for the benefit of the internal market commenced with the introduction of a “sui 
generis”64 special jurisdiction rule in Regulation EU 1215/2012, the Brussels I Recast 
Regulation.65 The essence of this new jurisdiction rule, contained in Article 7(4) is to give 
private parties greater choice of jurisdiction for making a claim for the recovery of cultural 
objects.66 It is this third technique to which we now turn. 
                                                          
59 Forrest, ibid, 136, words added and removed for syntax. 
60 Carruthers, supra n 39, 143. 
61 Forrest, supra n 4, 148. 
62 Nafziger, supra n 5, xiv. 
63 Forrest, supra n 4, 219. 
64 A Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts (Oxford: University Press, 2014), 283. 
65 “Regulation EU 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast),” 
[2012] OJ L351/1. 
66 Forrest, supra n 4, 219 ; Carruthers, supra n 39, 143; P Rogerson, “Jurisdiction for the Retrieval of Cultural 
Objects” in A Dickinson and E Lein (eds) The Brussels I Regulation Recast (Oxford University Press, 2015) 174-
176. 
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B. The emerging role of EU jurisdiction rules in the recovery of cultural objects  
According to Nafziger, 
“… claims for the return, restitution, or repatriation of cultural heritage have been of 
central importance.”67 
 
When a cultural object has been removed from one jurisdiction to another and a claim for its 
return is sought, the matter will require reference to rules of private international law. The 
nature of the claim must be classified, either as a patrimonial claim by the state or a private 
claim by a legal or natural person.  The cultural object must be identified68 and the location 
of the defendant69 with physical possession of the object must be established.  For Regulation 
EU 1215/2012 to apply, the defendant’s domicile in a Member State must be established in 
accordance with Article 4. As with the other special jurisdiction rules in Article 7, for Article 
7(4) to operate correctly, the Member State where the object is situated must be a distinct 
jurisdiction from where the defendant is domiciled. Once the nature of the claim is 
determined and jurisdiction is established, the applicable law rules of the court seised will 
apply. Each Member State applies its own applicable law rule (predominantly the lex situs) to 
determine what substantive law applies to questions of (inter alia)70 ownership and the 
essential71 validity of any transfer of ownership between the parties.72  Carruthers has 
                                                          
67 Nafziger (ed), supra n 5, xvi. 
68 Ulph and Smith, supra n 5, 174-176. 
69 In practice, either the possessor (Article 1(6)) or holder (Article 1(7)) of the cultural object; Directive 
93/7/EEC. 
70 Carruthers, supra n 39, 80-81 ; Council of the European Union, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Union and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (Recast), Note of the delegations of the United Kingdom and Cyprus on Article 5(2),” 
JUSTCIV 92, CODEC 707, 19 March 2012. 
71 L Collins et al (eds), Dicey, Morris and Collins, The Conflict of Laws (15th edn, Sweet and Maxwell, 2014), para 
34-026. 
72 It is settled that the lex situs, as the law of the place where the tangible property is situated, determines 
questions concerned with the nature, control of or title to such property. In England, it is applied as a strict 
choice of law rule: LJ Devlin in Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart NV v Slatford (No 1) [1951] 2 All ER 779 ; 
Winkworth v Christie Manson and Woods Ltd [1980] Ch 496; Dicey and Morris, ibid, para 24-005 ; Cheshire and 
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previously observed that, whilst distinct, issues of jurisdiction,73 applicable law and 
enforcement must nevertheless “interact”74 with one another. Recent legislative 
developments at EU level highlight that the “salient”75 role of the court seized (and thereby 
the lex fori) where a cultural object76 is situated has increased. The jurisdiction rule for the 
recovery of cultural objects unlawfully removed from a Member State in Regulation EU 
1215/201277 is a welcome development in furthering the principle of mutual recognition of 
Member States’ cultural objects and in providing judicial protection of cultural objects which 
may have been brought to an EU Member State. 
 
1. The role of the court seised under the EU regime: classification and jurisdiction  
Prior to the introduction of the “alternative”78 jurisdiction rule in Regulation EU 1215/2012, 
there was no special in rem jurisdiction rule for the recovery of movable property in 
Regulation EU 44/2001, the Brussels I Regulation. Article 3(2) and Annex 1 of Regulation EU 
44/2001 state that as far as the EU domiciled defendants are concerned, jurisdiction cannot 
be established under that Regulation (inter alia) on the basis of seizure of property in the 
jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction has traditionally79 been regarded as exorbitant. In addition, 
                                                          
North, supra n 33, 1224. Given the potential impact on the rights of the claimant and of third parties in claims 
for the recovery of a cultural object, attention may turn to the putative applicable law, the application of foreign 
law and the public policy rules of the court seised. 
73 Fawcett refers to the “underlying basis of the jurisdiction is a choice of law rule”; 1991 Current Legal 
Problems 39 ; Carruthers, supra n 39, 39. 
74 Carruthers, supra n 39, 38; P Rogerson, “Case Comment: Public Policy and Cultural Objects,” (2008) 
Cambridge Law Journal 246. 
75 Cottrell, supra n 8, 637. 
76 Chong, supra n 13. 
77 Brussels I Recast, supra n 65. 
78 Z C Reghizzi, “A New Special Forum for Disputes Concerning Rights in Rem over Moveable Assets: Some 
Remarks on Article 5(3) of the Commission’s Proposal,” in F Pocar, I Viarengo and F C Villata (eds), Recasting 
Brussels I : proceedings of the conference held at the University of Milan on November 25 - 26, 2011 (CEDAM, 
Padua, 2012), 173. 
79 M Weser, “Litigation on the Common Market Level,” (1964) American Journal of Comparative Law 44 ; G 
Maher and B J Rodger, Civil Jurisdiction in the Scottish Courts (W Green: Edinburgh, 2010), 116-117. 
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there appeared to be theoretical and practical challenges in establishing jurisdiction for the 
recovery of cultural objects on the basis of general or other special jurisdiction rules under EU 
1215/2012, which will now be briefly considered.  
The starting points are Recitals 8 and 11. Recital 8 necessitates a “link between 
proceedings to which this Regulation applies and the territory of the Member States bound 
by this Regulation.” Recital 11 reaffirms that a departure from the defendant’s domicile as 
the general rule is permissible on “subject-matter [or] party autonomy” grounds.  The 
application of the defendant’s domicile as general jurisdiction for claims for the recovery of 
tangible cultural objects is open, but tenuous if neither the defendant nor his domicile is 
known to the claimant. As the claim falls within the material scope of the Regulation, the 
defendant’s current (or possibly last known80) domicile under Article 4 could be utilised in 
claims for the recovery of a cultural object.81  The “alternative”82 special grounds of 
jurisdiction in Articles 7(1) and 7(2) are also of limited use. Unless the parties have a prior 
contractual relationship, the circumstances upon which the wrongful removal of a cultural 
object between jurisdictions is unlikely to constitute a “matter relating to contract” under 
Article 7(1). It remains a moot point as to whether the wrongful removal of a cultural object 
constitutes a “breach of obligation” 83 between the parties which would give rise to a claim in 
tort under Article 7(2). Taking account of the Court of Justice’s earlier decisions in Kalfelis v 
Schroder,84 Rudolf Gabriel85 and more recently in Melzer,86 Article 7(2) could only apply by 
                                                          
80 Case C-327/10 Hypotecní banka, a.s. v Udo Mike Lindner, [2011] ECR I-1154. 
81 Cf opinion of the Court of Appeal of Liege in X v Y 13 December 2012 that a claim for restitution fell within the 
scope of the Brussels I Regulation on the application of Article 2; 
<http://www.ipr.be/tijdschrift/tijdschrift46.pdf> accessed 16 August 2013. 
82 Maher and Rodger, supra n 79, 5. 
83 Briggs, supra n 64, 283. 
84 Case 189/87 Kalfelis v Schroder [1988] ECR 5565. 
85 Case C-96/00 Rudolf Gabriel [2002] ECR I-6367. 
86 Case C-228/11, Melzer v MF Global UK Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2013:305. 
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analogy to an in personam claim in tort in the courts of the place where the cultural object 
was wrongfully removed or not returned after a period of lawful removal (in accordance with 
Article 1(2) Directive EU 93/7). In accordance with recent authority from the Court of Justice 
in Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschiinenbau and Pinckney v Mediatech,87 both 
places could constitute the place of damage or the event giving rise to it. Furthermore, as the 
delegation of Cyprus to the Council of the European Union confirmed, an action under Article 
7(4) “is a property action […] It is not a tort action…”88  
Where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, Article 5 refers the matter 
to Member States’ residual jurisdiction.89  For both English and Scottish residual jurisdiction 
rules to operate against a non-EU defendant in personam, the movable property at issue must 
be located in those jurisdictions. In England, service out of the jurisdiction requires the 
permission of the court in accordance with Civil Procedure Rules 6.36 Practice Direction 6B 
Paragraph 3.1.11.90 Given the nature of movable property, as Briggs and Rees rightly observe, 
this jurisdiction rule is wide in its scope.91 However the balance should be found in the 
procedural requirements for jurisdiction. The claimant must show that there is a serious issue 
to be tried and that in accordance with Spiliada Maritime Corp., v Cansulex Ltd92 England is 
the appropriate forum in the interests of the parties and the ends of justice. The equivalent 
basis of jurisdiction in Scotland is Rule 2(i) of Schedule 8 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 
                                                          
87 Case C-523/10 Wintersteiger AG v Products 4U Sondermaschiinenbau ECLI:EU:C:2012:220 ; Case C-170/12 
Pinckney v Mediatech ECLI:EU:C:2013:635. 
88 Council of the European Union, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) – 
Comments from the delegation of Cyprus relating to Article 5(2),” JUSTCIV 223, CODEC 1593, 7 June 2012, 2. 
89 L Gillies, “Creation of Subsidiary Jurisdiction Rules In The Recast Of Brussels I: Back To The Drawing Board?” 
(2012) 8 Journal of Private International Law 489. 
90 CPR, Practice Direction 6B, “Service out of the Jurisdiction,” Paragraph 3.1.11. 
91 A Briggs and P Rees (ed), Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5th ed, Lloyds, 2009), 519 at para. 4.68. 
92 Spiliada Maritime Corp. v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. 
15 
 
Act 1982 (as amended).93 The claimant may alternatively try to bring proceedings against a 
non-EU domiciled defendant in tort. In England, if the claimant wished to sue in tort for 
conversion, he would have to seek the court’s permission to “serve out” and demonstrate a 
connection with England under CPR 6.36 Practice Direction 3.1.9 that damage to the property 
was sustained in the jurisdiction. In Scotland, an action in delict (“spuilzie”) may be brought 
against a non EU defender under Rule 2(c) of Schedule 8 to the 1982 Act if Scotland was the 
place where damage occurred to movable property. These rules may be subject to the 
defendant’s plea of forum non conveniens94 in applying for a stay (in England) or sist (in 
Scotland) of proceedings.  
2. “Demand side control”95 of cultural objects in Regulation EC 1215/2012 
Thirty five years ago, a UNESCO Committee – in accordance with Cornu’s observation – 
recommended Members should seek “ways and means of facilitating bilateral negotiations 
for the return of cultural property to its countries of origin.”96 As a result of the review of the 
Brussels I Regulation, the proposal for an additional special jurisdiction for disputes concerned 
with the recovery of cultural objects97 (as defined by Directive 93/7 EC) was accepted. In the 
original proposal for Regulation EU 1215/2012, the European Commission proposed a new 
Article 5(3) which would have provided a lex specialis jurisdiction rule for “rights in rem or 
possession of movable property” being “the courts for the place where the property is 
                                                          
93 Hereafter “the 1982 Act.” See P Beaumont and P McEleavy, Anton: Private International Law (3rd ed, W 
Green/SULI, Edinburgh, 2011) 327-329.  But see also in Scotland the much broader jurisdiction available in 
relation to arrestment of moveables under Rule 2(h)(i) of Schedule 8 to the 1982 Act; see Anton, ibid, 320-325. 
94 Cottrell, supra n 8, 638 and Anton, ibid, 359-367. 
95 Forrest, supra n 4, 156. 
96 Cornu and Renold, supra n 45, 3. 
97 B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation (EC) No 44/2001, The Heidelberg Report on the 
Application of Regulation Brussels I in 25 Member States (Study JLS/C4/2005/03), (Verlag C.H. Beck, 2008). 
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situated.”98 The origins of the proposal can be traced back to the Heidelberg Report. In that 
report, it was noted that Germany suggested the need for a “non-exclusive ground of 
jurisdiction … based on the situs of movable assets as far as rights in rem of possession are 
concerned.”99 The Rapporteurs of the Heidelberg Report confirmed that there was “some 
merit …”100 in introducing a fact-based/specific ground of jurisdiction and went on to 
recommend “establishing a (non-exclusive) forum based on the situs of movable property for 
cases where this property is the object of the controversy.”101 The “express innovation”102 of 
the initial proposal was to facilitate in rem jurisdiction as an alternative to in personam claims 
based either on the defendant’s domicile or one of the other special grounds of jurisdiction 
such as Article 7(2), briefly considered above. In addition, Reghizzi suggests that the 
justification for a special jurisdiction rule stemmed from concerns regarding enforcement of 
judgments in such cases where a judgment was obtained from a non-Member State.103  
The scope and content of the proposal for in rem jurisdiction over tangible, movable 
property was subsequently proposed as two discrete Options by a joint delegation of the 
United Kingdom and Cyprus and presented to the Council of the European Union. The 
delegations presented two options which contained the following elements. The first, and 
wider, option proposed that Article 5(2) (as it then was numbered) could establish jurisdiction 
over tangible, moveable property where “a violation of rights in rem…”104 had occurred. The 
                                                          
98 European Commission, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast),” 
2010/0383 (COD), 14.12.2010, COM (2010) 748 final at p.24. Words italicised for emphasis. 
99 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser, supra n 97, 73-74, para.153-154. 
100 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, ibid. 
101Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, ibid, 140, (para. 402) and 352 (para.876); Reghizzi, supra n 78, 174. 
102 B Hess, in Pocar, Viarengo and Villata (eds), supra n 1, 106. 
103 Reghizzi, supra n 78, 180. 
104 Council of the European Union, “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) – 
Drafting proposal for Article 5(2),” JUSTCIV 214 CODEC 1519, 8 June 2012. 
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proposal specified that the temporal scope would be established “at the time the court is 
seised.”105 The delegation also affirmed that Article 35 could be used to secure provisional or 
protective measures in an alternative jurisdiction to the forum in question.106 The aim of 
Article 35 is to provide a protective and strategic tactic107 in litigation. Its objective is to 
provide a “speedy”108 mechanism for a claimant to seek a “provisional or protective”109 
measure from a court in one or more Member States either at the initial110 or subsequent111 
stages of the litigation process. Measures sought under Article 31 may apply within the 
Member State, on an extra-territorial basis and/or against third parties, subject to rules on 
enforcement under Article 34. According to Masri v Consolidated Contractors (International) 
(UK) Ltd, a measure which is intended to apply extra-territorially must do so in accordance 
with “international law or comity.”112  The purpose of a (national) measure under Article 31 
may be to “maintain the status quo … prevent … asset dispos[al] [or to facilitate] 
investigation.”113 Measures which facilitate these purposes are relevant as far as disputes 
concerning cultural objects are concerned.114 Firstly, the measure may ensure that the 
cultural object remains in a particular jurisdiction, whilst proceedings under Article 7(4) 
continue. For example, Rule 25 of the English Rules of Civil Procedure (CPR) enables (inter 
alia) the sale of property.115 Second, the measure sought may prevent asset disposal to 
                                                          
105 Council of the European Union, CODEC 707, supra n 70, 1-2. 
106 Briggs and Rees, supra n 91, 139, 634, para 6.01. 
107 T Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and Their Impact on Third States (Oxford; University Press, 2008), 
353. 
108 Kruger ibid, 352. 
109 As distinct from interim; section 25, 1982 Act ; G Maher and B J Rodger “Provisional and Protective Remedies: 
the British experience of the Brussels Convention,” (1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 302, 
306; J Newton, The Uniform Interpretation of the Brussels and Lugano Conventions (Hart Publishing, 2002), 287. 
110 Maher and Rodger, ibid, 302. 
111 Maher and Rodger, ibid, 309-310. 
112 Masri v Consolidated Contractors (International) (UK) Ltd (No.2) [2009] QB 450 at 465. 
113 J Hill and A Chong, International Commercial Disputes Commercial Conflict of Laws in English Courts (4th ed, 
Hart, Oxford, 2010), 337-338. Words removed, modified and added for syntax. 
114 Hill and Chong ibid, 337. 
115 CPR Rule 25.1 (1) (c). 
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another party in the same or another jurisdiction. For example, Rule 25 of the CPR enables a 
party to enter premises in order to retain property116 or to freeze the defendant’s assets.117 
Following the Court of Justice’s approach in Van Uden, there must be a “real connecting 
link”118 between the measure and the jurisdiction of the Member State granting it for the 
purposes of “preserv[ing] a factual or legal situation so as to safeguard [the claimant’s] 
rights.”119 Third, the measure may facilitate investigation concerned with the location, state 
or provenance of the cultural object, the effect of physical transfer of the object, or to 
ascertain how the party came to be in possession of the object. The definition of what 
constitutes a provisional or protective measure has not been specifically articulated by the 
Official Reports or the CJEU. A question remains as to whether jurisdiction over the 
substance120 of the claim must have been first established, or is merely capable of being 
established.121   Whilst the Court of Justice in De Cavel v De Cavel122 confirmed that measures 
under Article 31 are subject to equivalent rules on recognition and enforcement under the 
Brussels I Regulation,123 the Court in Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères124 also confirmed that 
the enforcement of such measures in another Member State depends on whether the 
measure constitutes a judgment and how the enforcing court will give effect to it.125  
The second option offered by the delegation proposed a narrower jurisdiction rule 
applicable “where the property belongs to the cultural heritage of a Member State… [or] 
                                                          
116 CPR Rule 25.1 (1) (d). 
117 CPR 25.1 (1)(f). 
118 C-391/95 [1998] ECR I-7091 at 40; Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, supra n 97, 290-291, paras 653-654, referring to 
Van Uden.  
119 Van Uden, ibid, para.37; Briggs and Rees, supra n 91, 644, para.6.10. Words in brackets added for emphasis. 
120 Briggs and Rees affirm that jurisdiction “to the claim for relief must still be established”; Briggs and Rees, 
supra n 91, 647, para. 6.11, emphasis added. 
121 Maher and Rodger, supra n 109, 303, 304-307. 
122 C143/78 De Cavel v De Cavel [1979] ECR 1055. 
123 Newton, supra n 109, 295. 
124 (125/79) Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frère [1980] ECR 1553. 
125 Briggs and Rees, supra n 91, 658-661, para. 6.21. 
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where the property is registered, in the courts of the Member State where the register is 
situated …”126 The first part of this option was taken up by the European Parliament, which 
sought to justify the proposal as being “consistent” with other policy objectives for the 
protection of cultural objects.127 The final version of Article 7(4) of the Recast provides that:  
 “(A) person domiciled in a Member State may be sued in the courts of another 
Member State 
… 
4) as regards a civil claim for the recovery, based on ownership, of a cultural object as 
defined in point 1 of Article 1 of Directive 93/7/EEC initiated by the person claiming 
the right to recover such an object, in the courts for the place where the cultural object 
is situated at the time when the court is seised;” 128 
 
3. Article 7(4): scope and “counterbalance”129 to other grounds of jurisdiction in the 
Brussels I Recast 
As stated earlier, identification of the cultural object and the defendant130 with possession of 
it may be difficult to establish. There may be no prior relationship or connection between the 
claimant and defendant (who may be a thief, innocent bailee, custodier, third party holder or 
buyer). As considered earlier, a claimant must make a choice as to which special grounds of 
jurisdiction under Article 7 to use as an alternative to Article 4. A claim under Article 7(4) is 
brought in personam131 by the party claiming the right to recover in the place where the 
object is seized against a defendant domiciled in another Member State. The court seised will 
determine whether the property is classified as movable or immovable and the cause of 
action. The classification of movable property as a cultural object (defined by Directive 
                                                          
126 Council of the European Union, CODEC 707, supra n 70, 2, word italicised for emphasis. 
127European Parliament, “Amendment 121 Report,” 25 September 2012 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-
496.504+01+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN>. 
128 Words italicised for emphasis. 
129 Hess, in Pocar (eds), supra n 2, 107. 
130 In practice, either the possessor (Article 1(6)) or holder (Article 1(7)) of the cultural object; Directive 
93/7/EEC. 
131cf Reghizzi supra n 78, 178; words modified and removed for syntax. 
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93/7/EEC)132 must be autonomous,133 particular to the objectives of the basis of jurisdiction 
and respectful of Member States’ exclusive competence. As Recital 17 of Regulation EU 
1215/2012 indicates, a claim for recovery under Article 7(4) “should be”134 based on 
ownership of a cultural object. In England the classification of a claim is akin to an “action for 
recovery”135 of movable property rather than a claim in tort for wrongful interference with 
proprietary rights (conversion).136  
Reghizzi had reservations regarding the effectiveness of the original proposal for in 
rem jurisdiction over movable assets vis-à-vis concurrent claims. The incidence of concurrent 
claims may be limited to situations where a prior contractual relationship existed between 
the claimant (eg, a private individual or establishment such as a museum situated in a 
Member State) and the defendant who has or had possession of the object. However, Article 
7(4) may enable a degree of flexibility as to who may be sued. Different defendants may be 
subject to Article 7(4).  It will be necessary to consider whether or not the parties to the 
dispute have a prior existing relationship or contract which was breached by the defendant’s 
conduct (wrongful removal to a third jurisdiction or retention beyond an agreed contractual 
period in line with Directive EU 93/7).137 This will be fact-dependant, requiring the claimant 
to make a decision as to the principal basis on which to make a claim. As Recital 17 suggests, 
it will also be necessary to consider how the object came to be present in a particular 
                                                          
132 Cf footnote to revised Directive; Forrest, supra n 4, 148. 
133G Maher and B J Rodger, supra n 79, 108. 
134 Recital 17, Regulation EU 1215/2012. 
135 Dicey and Morris, supra n 71, para. 34-020 ; Council of the European Union, “Comments from the delegation 
of Cyprus relating to Article 5(2),” JUSTCIV 223, supra n 88, 2. 
136 Dicey and Morris, supra n 71, para 34-022. Depending on the prior connections between the parties, the 
claim may also be characterised as a breach of contract. 
137 An important distinction between removal and retention for choice of law purposes is made by Carruthers; 
the former being an example of “involuntary dispossession,” the latter “voluntary”; Carruthers supra n 39, 265 
at footnote 85. 
21 
 
jurisdiction (due to an initial or subsequent wrongful removal or (subsequent) transfer to the 
jurisdiction, in breach of lawful possession). A cultural object may be either wrongfully 
removed, retained (ie “not returned”138) or both. More than one defendant may be involved 
in these acts. To satisfy a claim for breach of contract under Article 7(1)(a), the defendant 
would have to remain in possession beyond the contractual term agreed or have transferred 
possession of the object to a third party in breach of contract.139 There may be an analogous 
claim in tort against the defendant in such a situation, but such a claim must be brought under 
Article 7(2). 
(a) “a civil claim for the recovery, based on ownership, …” 
The effective interpretation of this phrase will be crucial to the utility of Article 7(4). The 
objective of this special jurisdiction rule is, per Recitals 15 and 16 of the Recast, premised on 
a “predictable”140 jurisdiction rule which offers a “close connection”141 (the location of the 
object) with the forum. The phrase “civil claim for recovery” within Article 7(4) underpins the 
rationale for such proceedings, distinct from the alternative, special jurisdictional bases in 
contract and tort. To be of any value to a litigant, the phrase “based on ownership” requires 
to be carefully interpreted, irrespective of the Member State in which proceedings are 
brought. There are two ways in which the Court of Justice may approach the interpretation 
of the phrase “based on ownership.” One way may be to allude to the approach of Article 12 
of Directive EU 93/7 and Article 36 TFEU142 by analogy. Both Article 12 of Directive EU 93/7 
                                                          
138 European Commission, “Proposal For a Directive of The European Parliament and of The Council on The 
Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed From The Territory of a Member State (Recast),” 2013/0162 
(COD), 16 specifically proposed Articles 2(a) and (b). 
139 Carruthers, supra n 39, 265. 
140 Recital 15, EU 1215/2012. 
141 Recital 16, EU 1215/2012. 
142 Classification may operate prospectively; Article 14, Directive 93/7/EEC; 2013/0162 (COD), proposed Article 
1. 
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and Article 12 of Directive EU 2014/60, when it comes into force later this year, confirm that 
“(O)wnership of the cultural object after return shall be governed by that law of the 
requesting Member State.”143 If Article 7(4) is to be read and interpreted in line with Directives 
EU 93/7 and 2014/60, the putative applicable law may be the law of the Member State where 
the claimant has a valid and persisting right of ownership over the object. However, this 
presupposes that this is the originating Member State (lex originis)144 which classified the 
object as a national treasure prior to its unlawful removal or retention and the party wishes 
to rely upon that law for the basis of its claim for recovery. Alternatively, the phrase “based 
on ownership” may be interpreted through the enforcement of an earlier judgment asserting 
ownership145 from the courts of another Member State. Even though Regulation EC 
1215/2012 facilitates automatic recognition and limits grounds for refusal to enforce 
judgments, the effective enforcement of the judgment is still dependent upon establishing 
the object’s location. As a result, this approach is tenuous and the first approach is preferred 
in support of an autonomous interpretation. 
(b) “initiated by the person claiming the right to recover such an object …” 
Article 7(4) requires a civil claim for recovery to be based both on a party continuing to retain 
ownership of a cultural object, thereby entitling that party with a right to recover that object. 
As stated above, the claimant will have to demonstrate prior ownership, probably under the 
law of the originating Member State. As the previous paragraph considered, Article 7(4) raises 
the importance of interpreting the meaning of “the right to recover…” based on ownership.146  
                                                          
143 Article 12 Directive 93/7/EEC; proposed Article 12, 2010/0383(COD), supra n 98, 21; Directive EU 2014/60, 
supra n 21. 
144 Carruthers, supra n 39, 265-269. 
145 Forrest, supra n 4, 152 (citing the US case United States v An Antique Platter of Gold  991 F.Supp 222 (SDNY, 
1997), aff’d 184 F.3d 131 (2nd Cir. 1999)). 
146 P Rogerson, Collier’s Conflict of Laws, (4th ed, Cambridge University Press, 2013), 51. 
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Whilst the delegation of Cyprus confirmed that Article 7(4) “does not (and could not) address 
the question of which substantive law will be applied by the courts of the situs Member 
State,”147 the use of Article 7(4) in practice will provide an opportunity to affirm the role of 
the court seised in classifying and applying foreign law 148 at the jurisdiction stage and the role 
of the Court of Justice in interpreting this aspect of Article 7(4). Two observations may be 
offered. The first observation is that when a claim requires reference to a foreign law, the 
party seeking to rely on that foreign law must generally plead and prove the foreign law in 
accordance with the law of the court seised. The procedural basis for asserting and proving a 
foreign law remains distinct in each Member State, with approaches to foreign law varying 
from a “peculiar”149 fact, a “special”150 fact or “law of a different kind.”151 For example, Rule 
137 of Dicey and Morris confirms that the English courts will enforce a property right “if the 
act was valid and effective by the [lex situs].”152  Decisions of the English courts such as 
National Bank of Greece and Athens SA v Metliss153 and Bumper Development Corp., Ltd v 
Metropolitan Commissioner of Police154 both affirm the need to foster comity of nations 
through claims for the return of cultural objects. Whilst Hartley155 regarded the distinction 
vis-à-vis foreign law as innocuous in practice, if the “sui generis” special jurisdiction rule is to 
secure greater coordination of proceedings for the effective return of cultural objects, the 
                                                          
147 Council of the European Union, “Comments from the delegation of Cyprus relating to Article 5(2),” JUSTCIV 
223, supra n 88, 3. 
148 C Esplueges, J L Iglesias and G Palao (eds), Application of Foreign Law (Sellier: European Law Publishers, 
Munich, 2011), 91. 
149 T C Hartley, “Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law: The Major EU Systems Compared,” (1996) 45 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 271, 272. 
150 Rogerson, supra n 74, 247. 
151 Parkasho v Singh [1968] P. 233, 280 per Cairns J.; Hartley, supra n 149, 272. 
152 Dicey and Morris, supra n 71, Rule 137, Chapter 25. 
153 National Bank of Greece and Athens SA v Metliss [1958] AC 509. 
154 Bumper Development Corp., Ltd v Metropolitan Commissioner of Police [1991] 1 WLR 1362, CA. 
155 Hartley, supra n 149. 
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distinction must be reflected in an autonomous interpretation of the phrase “a claim … based 
on ownership …”  
The second and wider observation is whether an approximated public policy rule for 
the enforcement of foreign law is also necessary for the protection of cultural objects? As far 
as the English courts are concerned, the general premise is that foreign “illegal, penal or 
public”156 laws are not applied by the court. However, as Rogerson reminds us, the distinction 
is not clear cut since their classification “turn[s] on the drafting of the original law and its 
unpredictable interpretation by the English courts.”157 Once classified, the “critical” 158 issue 
is whether or not the applicable law (lex situs or the foreign law relied upon by the claimant) 
requires the claimant to have legal possession of the cultural object. As far as the English 
courts are concerned, if possession is established according to foreign law (not one of the 
three categories referred to above), that law will be recognised by the English courts.159 In 
Government of Iran v Barakat Ltd160 various cultural objects had been unlawfully excavated 
from Iran and passed through Europe in order that good title could be acquired for the 
purposes of sale. The Government of Iran brought proceedings in the English courts for 
recovery of the objects on the basis that the objects were part of Iranian national heritage. 
The question at first instance was whether the Government of Iran could make a claim in 
conversion under English law for the return of the objects or were barred from doing so by 
seeking enforcement of a foreign public law. On appeal, the English Court of Appeal classified 
the claim, and the relevant Iranian law, as patrimonial161 enabling the Iranian Government to 
                                                          
156 Rogerson, supra n 74, 247. 
157 Rogerson, supra n 74, 249. Word modified for syntax. 
158 Rogerson, supra n 74, 249. 
159 Forrest, supra n 4, 153. 
160 [2007] ECWA CIv 1374. 
161 Dicey and Morris, supra n 71, para 24-012; Chong, supra n 3, 107 and Rogerson, supra n 74, 248. 
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proceed with the claim. Whilst the wider effect of the Barakat case may be to generate 
greater “reciprocity”162 between the English courts and foreign States seeking the return of 
their cultural objects, subsequent views of the English Court of Appeal’s approach in this case 
have been divisive. Some favour this approach from the perspective of comity, whilst others 
maintain that the approach taken by the English Court of Appeal has not improved legal 
certainty at all.163 These criticisms highlight the point made by Hartley 164 and more recently 
by Esplueges et al165 who conclude, inter alia, that irrespective of different traditions and 
categorisations of foreign law, differing systems of civil justice across the Member States 
continue to have the greatest impact upon the success of a claim based on a foreign law. 
The reliance on foreign law as the basis of a “claim for recovery, based on ownership” 
will continue to present both a challenge and an opportunity in securing the recovery of 
cultural objects. As Chong observes, the opportunity may be “used to give effect to a 
fundamental human right”166 whereas the challenge “may lead to the application of an 
otherwise inapplicable foreign public law protecting that state’s cultural heritage.”167 These 
competing interests will have to be reconciled in determining how “recovery, based on 
ownership” is interpreted by the CJEU. In the meantime, the enforcement of foreign law will 
continue to be restricted only where it is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the 
court seised.  
  
                                                          
162 Chong, supra n 3, 107. 
163 Rogerson, supra n 74, 249 and supra n 146, 405. 
164 Hartley, supra n 149, 291-292. 
165 Esplueges et al, supra n 148, 6, 7-8, 70, 90. 
166 Chong, supra n 3, 113. 
167 Chong, ibid. 
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(c) “…in the courts for the place where the object is situated …” 
Article 7(4) jurisdiction is established “in the courts for the place where the object is situated 
at the date the court is seised.” The first part (ergo the sufficiently “close link”168) is the “courts 
for the place where the cultural object is situated.”  Applying the Court of Justice’s decision 
in Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH169 by way of analogy, Article 7(4) 
should enable a claimant to raise proceedings in one or more courts of the place within a 
Member State where the object is situated. This may provide the claimant with flexibility in 
situations where the object has been moved within or to another Member State or, where 
provisional measures are not available, were not granted or cannot extend on an extra-
territorial basis170  to another Member State. 
(d) “… at the time when the court is seised.” 
Since tangible, movable property may be more readily displaced than other forms of property, 
Article 7(4) seeks to establish the point in time when the cultural object is deemed to be 
situated in a Member State. Article 32 of the Recast171 confirms the position under the current 
Regulation. The date on which the court is seised depends upon whether the documents were 
lodged with the court (Article 31(1)(a)) or were served in advance (Article 32(1)(b)). In 
practice, the success of a claim under Article 7(4) may depend on whether the defendant has 
knowledge of an impending claim under Article 7(4) and attempts to “displace”172 the cultural 
                                                          
168 Reghizzi, supra n 78, 174. 
169 Color Drack GmbH v Lexx International Vertriebs GmbH [2007] ECR I-3699; Wood Floor Solutions Andreas 
Domberger GmbH v Silva Trade SA [2010] ECR I-2121. 
170 Briggs and Rees rightly highlight that irrespective of the defendant’s domicile, there is an underlying need 
for consistency when applying relief on an extra-territorial basis; Briggs and Rees, supra n 91, 651, para. 6.14. 
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object to another jurisdiction, prior to the court becoming seised. The time the court is seised 
is pivotal to Article 7(4) being established, regardless of subsequent events. As stated earlier, 
the opportunity for provisional or protective measures under Article 35 should be assessed 
at the earliest stage of proceedings. 
C. Conclusion: the utility of the conflict of laws in facilitating demand side regulation of 
cultural objects 
This article has sought to consider the jurisdictional basis for private claims for the recovery 
of cultural objects in the courts of a Member State introduced by Article 7(4) of Regulation 
EU 1215/2012. This special jurisdiction rule is a welcome development towards facilitating 
the return of a cultural object - from a place of market demand or where the object is in 
transit- to a party asserting ownership. However, in practice the utility of this special 
jurisdiction rule will depend upon its scope and interpretation by the Court of Justice together 
with its ability to offer a “counterbalance”173 to Article 4 and the other special grounds of 
jurisdiction in the Regulation. In a similar fashion to when a claimant decides whether to sue 
either under Article 7(1) or 7(2), Article 7(4) will also be treated as a distinct special jurisdiction 
rule under the Brussels I Recast which will operate as an alternative to Article 4. Crucial to the 
effectiveness of Article 7(4) for the coordination of claims against EU domiciliaries will be an 
autonomous interpretation of a number of key elements. One such key phrase is “a claim, 
based on ownership.”  If an autonomous interpretation is sought, this phrase must be 
interpreted with due regard to Article 12 of DirectIve EU 2014/60, when it comes into force. 
The scope of Article 7(4) applies to claims “initiated by the person claiming the right to recover 
such an object.” This too, will require to be autonomously interpreted so that the special 
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jurisdiction rule assures “intended results through the avoidance of fortuitous connecting 
factors.”174 Another key phrase in Article 7(4) is the link between the claim and “courts for 
the place where the object is situated at the time when the court is seised.” This phrase should 
also be interpreted to enable proceedings to be brought in that part of a Member State where 
the object is situated, at a time which accords with Article 31(1)(a) of the Brussels I Recast. 
Finally, in an attempt to prevent further displacement of the cultural object between 
jurisdictions, Article 35 should be utilised through the application of Member States’ 
provisional or protective measures. This paper concludes that the special jurisdiction rule is a 
key step towards the EU leading a “transnational policy of protection of cultural property.”175 
Whilst further approximation of both applicable law and rules to determine the application 
(proof) of foreign law in claims for the recovery of cultural objects are distant objectives, the 
value of the sui generis jurisdiction rule at EU level will be to contribute towards the return of 
cultural objects removed from or present in Member States where demand shifts as markets 
change, which in turn will increase intra-EU and external cooperation for the recovery of 
cultural objects. 
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